Navigating a Volatile Climate Measure Landscape

What nations can do and the case of Japan

5 February 2025

Japanese version: 20 January 2025

Kenichiro Yamaguchi
Energy and Sustainability Division

November 2024 brought two pivotal events for climate change measures: the US elections and COP29. In the former, the Republican Party won the presidential election while gaining a majority in the both the House and the Senate. In the latter, the world’s nations were able to reach an agreement, but not without contention. These two events offer insight into how global climate change will play out in the coming years.

Implications of the US elections

As the world’s largest economy and the second greatest emitter of greenhouse gases, the US has much sway over global climate change policymaking. Because of this, as well as the stark differences in the climate policies of the two major parties, the outcome of the 2024 US elections will bring a significant change to the climate agenda. Climate change policies under the newly inaugurated Trump administration are likely to diverge significantly from the previous administration.

The difference in the two parties goes well beyond their presidential candidates. By controlling both the Senate and the House, the Republican party can draft and instate new legislation; they can also roll back many Biden-era policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act, which was passed by a then Democratic majority in the House and a tie-breaker by the Speaker in the Senate. The party might also have a chance to further fortify the conservative majority in the Supreme Court, by either replacing Democrat-appointed justices upon their retirement or replacing conservative justices with much younger ones. The change in the judicial power balance can have an effect long outlasting the Presidency, possibly by decades.

As expected, the Trump administration is rolling back climate policies. Immediately after his inauguration on 20 January 2025, the US announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and a pause on funding through the Inflation Reduction Act. It remains to be seen whether the announcement means the rollback of the entire Act, as many sectors, including energy and automobiles, have benefited from its subsidies and tax breaks. It is plausible that the administration will use it as a future bargaining chip.

Agreement at COP29, contention regarding New Collective Quantified Goal

The 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was held in Baku, Azerbaijan with parties coming to an agreement on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance for developing countries, the main item on the agenda.

The parties agreed to scale up climate finance to developing countries “from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035” as well as set a goal of “at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action” with developed countries taking the lead. The USD 300 billion goal, about 1.5 times the current level of ODA, is considered as a subset of USD 1.3 trillion goal and includes funding from the private sector and development banks. The outcome on NCQG is close to what the developed countries, which are always cautious—if not reluctant—to provide finance, have been advocating. In response, developed countries dropped their insistence that developing countries implement climate change measures such as the introduction of renewable energy in a harmonized manner, as opposed to each country deciding on what the appropriate policies are.

Least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) opposed the above proposal during the negotiation process. LDCs, which cannot realistically expect substantial private-sector funding, pushed for the bulk of their climate finance to come in highly concessional terms such as grants rather than commercial loans. SIDS, which are deeply concerned about sea level rise, argued for implementation of full-fledged measures regardless of whether a country is developed or developing. Although these countries account for about 40% in terms of the number of Parties, and at one stage walked out of the negotiations in protest, their preferences were not reflected in the final agreement.

Making sense of the COP29 agreement: China’s growing presence in financing developing countries

Chronologically, the outcome of the US election was known by the time COP29 started. Countries were negotiating with a delegation from the Biden administration, while knowing that the Trump administration and a Republican-led Congress would take over in 2025. This meant that the delegates were aware that they could not realistically expect US cooperation for the next four years. While COP29 did not explicitly address the outcome of the US elections, the resulting agreement was more pragmatic than ambitious, taking into account a looming stagnation in global cooperation to combat climate change and climate finance for developing countries in particular.

The closing plenary of COP29 provides insight for predicting the future of climate change measures. At the closing, India vehemently protested the outcome of the agreement on NCQG.* Meanwhile, LDCs and SIDS, which had walked out earlier in the event, and neighboring Pakistan were comparatively quiet. China’s reaction deserves particular attention: criticism of the agreement was minimal and the wording “South–South cooperation” in the document was warmly welcomed. This points to the possibility that China is seeking to play a major role in future climate financing for developing countries.

China produces a majority of the world’s solar and wind power equipment and is the third largest source of outward direct investment, only after the US and Japan.1 With little or no climate finance to be expected from the US, China may be charting a strategy of leadership by using its own financial institutions to aggressively export its renewable energy equipment and power transmission infrastructure to developing countries. If so, it would be able to exert influence over many developing countries through financing, which would also help secure its own resource interests and potentially improve its sometimes negative international reputation.

*Despite India’s protests, the agreement was adopted; the reason for this was presumably that India did not raise a point of order in the proceedings and insisted that its protest should be taken note of. It is said that high-level negotiations took place in the background to this

Confusion in store for 2025

The November 2024 events have put nations in an awkward position with regard to their climate policies. As long as the science of climate change remains intact, they cannot logically backtrack their current goals—for Japan, carbon neutrality by 2050. A defining feature of climate change measures is that while the costs are borne by those who implement them, the benefits extend around the world. However, this can easily lead to “free riders”, who are reluctant to bear the costs of climate measures and attempt to take advantage of the measures implemented by other countries. This could very well end up sapping the worldwide momentum for climate measures in 2025.
 
There are a few things that countries can do to stave off stagnation. First, they must strengthen partnerships with other countries. The renewed Trump administration is pursuing hardline diplomacy demanding concessions from other countries on various fronts, and there is a general wariness around the world of China’s willingness to fill the void left by the US. The rest of the world, including Japan, would do best to accelerate cooperation, including climate change measures.

For Japan, a network based on CCS, hydrogen, and ammonia production and supply in Southeast Asia and the Middle East would be beneficial for the countries involved and the planet as a whole. Similarly, common ground can be found in promoting energy conservation and the decarbonization of AI, where energy consumption has taken off in recent years, and measures to facilitate synergy between circular economy and climate change efforts. Even the US and China might eventually come around too.
 
Secondly, countries can use the next few years to harmonize, where possible, their climate measures with their long-term national goals. This will set each up for effective international cooperation. For Japan, the December 2024 draft of its next basic energy plan outlines the energy and electricity mix for 2040. The contents of the plan are ambitious: CO2 emissions will be reduced to about 30% of the current level based on the assumption that final energy consumption will be reduced by about 15%. On the other hand, carbon pricing, which forms the core of the current GX policy, is expected to be relatively moderate before 2030.2 As Japan’ revises its NDC goal under the Paris Agreement, it will be necessary to present a more concrete picture in the middle of that period, 2035, when climate change measures will truly be in full swing. These visions, together with effective policies, have potential to serve as a positive message to the world, in terms of climate change mitigation, fostering international cooperation.

Works Cited

1United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2024) 2024 World investment report (Note: used data for 2023, excluding Hong Kong)

2Takagi (2025) “Japanese Carbon Price Forecast Based on the GX Promotion Act” Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc.

Author profile

Author

Kenichiro Yamaguchi

Energy and Sustainability Division

Kenichiro Yamaguchi has extensive knowledge on climate change policy. His work ranges from carbon neutral strategies for the private sector to consulting on corporate sustainability disclosure. As a member of an international expert panel developing quantitative methods to assess the performance of GHG emissions reduction projects, he is well known throughout the world.